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The death penalty raises serious questions regarding the unequal and
arbitrary application of the law. Indeed, the appropriateness of a death
penalty verdict has long been considered as relying on myriad elements,
as indicated in the Model Penal Code, drafted by the American Law Institute in 1959. The code states “the factors which determine whether the
sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in particular cases are too
complex to be compressed within the limits of a simple formula.” 1 Using
a similar rationale, in the case McGautha v. California, the Supreme Court
held that the jury did not need to follow defined guidelines that could have
limited the scope of elements of fundamental importance. 2 However, this
trend was reversed in the early 1970s in Furman v. Georgia, which annulled all existing penalty laws. 3 The Furman Court asserted, in a lengthy
decision comprised of nine separate opinions, the necessity of guiding the
jury’s discretion. Fundamental to this guidance of capital punishment are
the principles of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment
and due process in the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Lockett v.
Ohio. 4 As Justice Stevens stated elsewhere, the death sentence “is the one
punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally
understand such rules,” 5 but is instead an ethical judgment expressing the
conscience of the community as to whether “an individual has lost his
moral entitlement to live.” 6
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A death penalty “decision must occur past the point to which legalistic reasoning can” be applied, since the death penalty exceeds the threshold of law and relates to arguments beyond it, among which there are several fundamental political elements. 7 The advent of the neoliberal revival
of the 1970s, first as a new ideology emphasizing the value of free market
competition, and then as a policy model and practice of government, has
had a significant impact on the consideration of individuals within society.
Lockett v. Ohio is part of this context, setting the stage for a societal mutation featuring a revaluation of the individual and his or her fundamental
freedoms within a certain consensus outlined by the Supreme Court, and
in this case its legacy. Still, a fissure has emerged in the interpretation of
the Lockett ruling among the Justices: the arbitrary aspect of mitigating
factors divided the Court. Political elements have influenced and built
upon the jurisprudence of this judgment and its legacy, both at the constitutional and national levels, with an emphasis on states that have particularly changed their position on this issue in their jurisprudence. These
states have followed a Supreme Court that is internally and locally challenged by the Lockett ruling and have opened new perspectives and issues.
I. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: LOCKETT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT
CONSENSUS
The first part of this article aims to contextualize Lockett v. Ohio in
relation to the changes that neoliberalism has brought about in American
society by emphasizing the notion of individual responsibility. This notion has been celebrated in political discourse, in the face of the State losing its economic authority and replacing its authority in the security domain with the prism of a political discourse crystallizing these elements.
The economic appeal of the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment has generated greed and a heightened political focus on the
capital sentence decisions.
As far as legal theory is concerned, the corollary of the concept of
neoliberalism in relation to the death penalty can find support in different
legal camps even though it is more likely to be present in neo-conservatism. From Bruce Ackerman’s perspective, the issue is not liberalism v.
conservatism, but conservatism v. neoconservatism, the latter having its

7. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Colloquy: Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1047, 1048–49 (1991).
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triumph confirmed by President Reagan’s selections or stealth appointments. 8 It is on the basis of these elements that the second part of the article will analyze the Lockett case law and legacy during the following
four decades that defined its interpretation and reduced the use and practice of the death penalty, by establishing mitigating factors.
A.

Neoliberalism: From Exogenous to Endogenous Factors

In order to fully understand the Lockett Court and its Justices, it is
essential to appreciate the political context in which the Court functioned.
Prior to the appointment of Chief Justice Burger, liberal democrats dominated from 1932-1968, with one exception during Eisenhower’s two
terms. Eisenhower’s success was not really that of the Republican party.
Rather, it was an idiosyncratic accomplishment resulting from his lack of
previous political affiliation and his skills as a military commander. Thus,
Democratic liberalism mostly dominated the political scene, particularly
when it came to Congress. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had a natural
inclination towards such ideals, especially under the Warren Court. At the
same time the homicide rate in the United States, more than doubled from
1957 to 1980, increasing from 4 to 10.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. 9 The crime rate increased in all domains from petty theft to firstdegree murder. Between 1964 and 1974 alone, the U.S. homicide rate
nearly doubled to 9.8 per 100,000 people. 10
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, the flood
of violence had a major impact on American society and transformed the
political scene while impacting institutions and their policies. In the 1960s
the issue of violence became a cornerstone of public debate. During this
decade, a paradox arose: while crime increased, punishment did not. The
probability of a crime being resolved by an arrest went from 10% to 2%. 11
That is, it became five times less likely for a crime to be punished. 12 The
war on poverty led by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson can be seen as an
interventionist approach with the federal state taking over the prerogatives
of local actors. Such an approach aligned with the liberal legacy of the

8. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1169 (1988).
9. James Alan Fox et al., Homicide Trends in the U.S., U.S. BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2007),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf. [https://perma.cc/ZNZ9-ASGB].
10. Id.
11. See James Q. Wilson & Richard J. Herrnstein, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 424-25 (1985);
Franklin E. Zimring, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 47 fig. 3.2 (2007).
12. See Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in DO
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 6 (Steven Raphael &
Michael A. Stoll eds., 2008).
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1930s, namely President Roosevelt’s New Deal. The liberal interventionist policy of the Democrats in the 1960s focused on targeted policies. For
instance, the Great Society represented a set of domestic programs under
the Democratic administration of President Johnson seeking to tackle racial inequalities and poverty. 13 Johnson’s first public reference to the
“Great Society” took place during a speech to students on May 7, 1964,
at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio: “And with your courage and with
your compassion and your desire, we will build a Great Society. It is a
society where no child will go unfed, and no youngster will go unschooled.” 14 Johnson’s programs outlined the need to address the root
causes of crime.
The 1960s brought about a pendulum swing in views regarding social issues, particularly in terms of how to deal with crime. The 1960s
became a decade of transformational change and federal activism. The
political wars between liberals and conservatives caused angry divisions
over law and order. Even though Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of
Arizona lost the 1964 presidential election to Democratic liberal Lyndon
Johnson, his campaign and discourse paved the way for Ronald Reagan’s
new conservatism (or neoliberalism) in 1980. Thus, the 1960s led to the
emergence of political debate on the issue of public order in the face of
growing crime. The political spectrum became divided into two antagonistic postures regarding how to eradicate crime.
On the one hand, the Democratic Party sought to tackle deterministic
factors, such as poverty and discrimination, in order to counter the crime
wave phenomenon. By comparison, the Republicans promoted a more punitive approach, in which strengthening the police state took a prominent
position in the political discourse. The end of the 1960s saw the election
of Republican Richard Nixon in a time characterized by polarization of
the electorate. This time period represents a major political realignment.
Southern states fell into the conservative fold when they had been a solid
bastion of Democrats in past decades. A political breakthrough in the sunbelt states significantly impacted the Republican approach to violence, reinforcing a conservative perspective. There began a public association between crime and the African American community in a society
experimenting with desegregation. A growing proportion of the white
13. See Elizabeth Hinton; “A War within Our Own Boundaries”: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. OF AM. HISTORY 100, 100-12, (June 2015); also see
CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 280
(1992).
14. President Johnson, Remarks in Athens at the Ohio University, (May 7, 1964) http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26225 [https://perma.cc/B5U8-Q6RJ].
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population began to assign responsibility for crime to the African American population. Meanwhile, the rise in national crime rates paralleled an
exceptional period in which punishments for many crimes were easing.
At the Supreme Court level, a series of landmark decisions characterized by judicial activism under the Warren Court left an unprecedented
legacy in civil rights and liberties while restricting police authority and
expanding the rights of the accused. 15 Conservative critics began charging
the Court with being soft on crime. As for the American Bar Foundation,
its research emphasized the need to avoid arbitrary power with ideas of
uniformity, neutrality, and proceduralism in law enforcement and sentencing. 16 In essence, the Supreme Court was at the heart of the crime debate
in the 1970s, with its own political vision of crime and its corollary death
penalty.
The acceptance of Lockett was important for the Burger Court because it took up the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty. This
question had already been taken up in Gregg v. Georgia, so it became
essential to consider the importance of individual elements in these particular cases. Sandra Lockett, who physically did not take part in the
crime, was a perfect candidate to stir up deeper discussion and debate.17
The Lockett decision is rare when it comes to the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion refers to the plea bargain offered three times to
Sandra Lockett in order to uphold his stance favoring an aggravated murder charge and thus the possibility of the death penalty.
This decision in 1978 by the U.S Supreme Court was surprising following the moratorium and the reinstatement of executions in Gregg v.
Georgia. 18 In Lockett (and its companion case, Bell v. Ohio) 19 the Supreme Court invalidated Ohio’s death penalty statute because it was “incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 20
The decision was based on the fact that the defendant was not given
an opportunity to present as mitigating factors any aspect of her character.
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966) (holding that statements made during an
interrogation while in police custody, “without full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible
as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (holding that “evidence obtained by unconstitutional search was
inadmissible and vitiated conviction”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963) (holding that
in all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to counsel and that an “indigent defendant in a
criminal prosecution in a state court has the right to have counsel appointed for him”).
16. Fellman, David, Constitutional Law in 1959-1960, 55 THE AM. POLITICAL SCI. REVIEW 1,
112-35 (1961).
17. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
18. Id.
19. 438 U.S. 637, 643 (1978)
20. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
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The Court held that the legislature could limit what were considered aggravating factors but could not limit the category of mitigating factors,
stating that juries must “not be precluded from considering as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 21 The Court asserted the principle of individualized
sentencing and ruled that “the need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with the degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far
more important than in noncapital cases.” 22
The Lockett doctrine did not fit with all points in the Court’s previous
reasoning. Although both Gregg v. Georgia and Furman v. Georgia are
fundamental, Lockett v. Ohio is of a new era in the interpretation of the
8th Amendment but also serves as a fundamental marker of a whole new
detention and interpretative policy. 23 With particular reference to the penal state, Lockett involves an individual consideration and the analysis of
factors inherent to each individual’s background, initiating the entry of a
new form of law rationale relating to the death penalty. From considerations of intrinsic principles to exogenous social factors, such as poverty,
racism and violence, the Lockett case law refocuses on endogenous individual factors such as one’s childhood, personality, situation, and motives
to name a few. What Aristotle called the difference between equity and
justice might be illustrated in this change in death sentencing. 24 Lockett
opened a new era. Dworkin and Hart agree that judges in hard cases frequently exercise strong discretion. 25 Discretion has become even stronger
since Lockett v. Ohio.
The Lockett decision discusses application of the death penalty but
does not call into question its constitutionality. Rather it emphasizes personal responsibility for one’s detrimental acts against the social fabric. It
aims to provide a better appreciation for endogenous personal factors. One
may criticize the fact that it places responsibility fully on the criminal
while excluding certain elements of the American history; it negates society’s joint responsibility for poverty and exclusion by emphasizing free
will. The decision also represents a balance of power between politics and

21. Id. at 604.
22. Id. at 587.
23. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
24. See Allan Beever, Aristotle on Equity, Law, and Justice, 10 LEG. THEORY 33, 33-50 (2004);
Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119
(1942); Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).
25. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967).
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law—though the law also was influenced by policy. Following the Furman judgment for instance, states gained clearer legislative provisions;
legislative revisions have provided states more clarity. From a political
perspective, the neoliberal current within the Republican party has been
very influential. Neoliberals desire to renew the country following the
early liberal tradition of John Locke and Adam Smith—the triumphant
capitalism of the 19th century. Neoliberalism emphasizes the individual
in conformity with the Lockean principle that individual choices transcend states imposing law: “every man has a ‘property’ in his own ‘person’. This nobody has any right to but himself.” 26 According to this thinking, people have inherent rights that preempt government, and
governments exist to protect these rights.
Locke’s principle of individuation differentiates the self from others.
This idea forms the conceptual basis and logical continuity of the Lockett
decision. Indeed, it follows naturally from the logic of the 1973 Roe v.
Wade decision made by the Burger Court. 27 This new societal orientation
based on neoliberalism has promoted the adoption of new public management principles aligned with public choice theory. In essence, this approach viewed human behavior as essentially self-interested. 28 The neoliberal position does not pose the “market against the state,” or even the
ideal of “more market, less state.” 29 Rather, it supports a particular kind
of state.
At the end of the 1970s and 1980s, along with the neoliberalism ideology came positions of monetarism and supply-side economics, which
appealed to the Reagan administration. Active and punitive security policies were deployed and disseminated in order to circumscribe insecurity,
be it concrete and physical, or be it a vague and obscure feeling exacerbated for the political purpose of conquering the electorate based on a discourse of the necessity of further repression of violence. The penal state
was thus reinforced and consolidated. This security policy generated a
tenfold increase in the resources of prison administrations, in parallel with
the privatization of prisons managed by private companies, which quickly
appeared to be active and present on the stock market. In 1983 for-profit
confinement unfolded. Prison administrations thus started to become the

26. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 116 (1690).
27. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
28. John M. Kamensky, Role of the “Reinventing Government” Movement in Federal Management Reform, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247, 247 (1996); See also Richard Culp Prison Privatization
Turns 25, U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY READER 183, 183-210, (2011).
29. JAMIE PECK & ADAM TICKELL, CONCEPTUALIZING NEOLIBERALISM, THINKING
THATCHERISM, IN CONTESTING NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN FRONTIERS 26-50 (2007).
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third largest employer in the United States 30, with major political consequences and constant pressure on the issues and the exercise of justice.
Garland describes this new policy as a “reinvention of the prison.” 31
Institutions were largely discredited between 1960 and 1970. They again
became a pillar of the social order with the decline of the rehabilitative
perspective in favor of the incapacitate one. It was therefore a global, societal transformation. The punitive approach to law and order holds the
punitive economy as a central pillar for prisons. The managerial model
turned away from penal welfarism to move towards neoliberalism under
the support of President Reagan. As Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell explain: “Only rhetorically does neoliberalism mean ‘less state’; in reality,
it entails a thoroughgoing reorganization of governmental systems and
state-economy relations.” 32 In this sense, the relationship between the judiciary branch and politics has become fundamental, particularly when it
comes to the death penalty.
Lockett v. Ohio raised more questions about mitigating factors as it
provided a new framework by redefining its search for a viable standard
in death penalty cases. Nevertheless, it left the door open to wide interpretation. On the other hand, this trend in using the death penalty, with the
consideration of individual and vague elements Lockett allowed, led the
legislator of the federal states to reiterate and re-conceptualize the notion
of aggravating factors as an interpretative legislative check on the judiciary by circumscribing the possibilities for interpretation while either reducing the prosecutor’s possibilities for a capital punishment application
or reinforcing the options for charging. A series of significant cases in the
1980s provided some clarification on Lockett’s scope with a Supreme
Court’s relatively clear-cut approach on the legal rationale
B.

The Contours of the Lockett Principle

Eddings v. Oklahoma falls within the ideological line of Lockett. The
Supreme Court states that it now applies “the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of this case.” 33 This decision allowed the Supreme Court to
define more precisely the contours of the jurisprudence thus established
by the Lockett decision concerning mitigating factors. This 1982 decision

30. WACQUANT, LOÏC, PRISONS OF POVERTY 47-54 (2002).
31. David Garland, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 14 (2001).
32. Peck & Tickell, supra note 29, at 26.
33. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113 (1982).
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clarifies the concept of mitigating circumstances in the Lockett ratio decidendi.
In this case, the defendant Eddings, 16 years old at the time of the
offence, had been in the lower courts convicted of first-degree murder for
killing a police officer and sentenced to death. The Court avoids the issue
of the constitutionality of executing a juvenile. The sentencing judge as
well as the state appellate court had operated on the grounds that various
mitigating elements could not be considered as a matter of law. In Eddings
v Oklahoma, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Powell (joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor, Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White dissenting) the Court asserted that “ it is to say that just as the chronological age of a minor is
itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly
considered in sentencing.” 34 The Court reversed and considered that the
death penalty had not been properly imposed in this case. 35 The majority
opinion held that “the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances.” 36
In Eddings, the Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Lockett
that capital punishment must be imposed by taking mitigating factors into
account in accordance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In this
5-4 decision, the Court recalled the principle as stated in Lockett: “the rule
in Lockett is the product of a considerable history reflecting the law’s effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.” 37
Eddings v. Oklahoma thus required state courts to hear any mitigating circumstances offered by a juvenile defendant subject to the death penalty.
Each legislature was also left to decide whether the execution of a juvenile
was constitutional.
To further comprehend the Lockett principle, it is also interesting to
focus on the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice Burger, who drafted
the Lockett judgment. Chief Justice Burger’s Eddings dissent further explained elements behind the rationale in Lockett. He listed three mitigating
factors: the role played in the offence, the intention, and the defendant’s
age. Chief Justice Burger states: “We therefore found the Ohio statute

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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flawed, because it did not permit individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances—such as the defendant’s comparatively minor role in
the offense, lack of intent to kill the victim, or age.” 38 Chief Justice
Burger’s approach refers to the fact that it is not a problem related to the
lack of consideration of mitigating, individual circumstances, but that this
is a semantic consideration. In this sense, previous decisions have established that the accused had a chaotic and problematic family background
and an emotionally unstable personality.
According to the dissenting opinion, these elements were indeed considered in the decisions rendered previously, even though they do not appear as clearly labeled, individual, attenuating factors. However, their importance in view of the aggravating circumstances remains minor power
in the balance assessing the required sentence. It is a question of confronting the individual attenuating circumstances, comparing them with the aggravating factors, and determining the most just sanction. The dissent does
not violate the rule established in Lockett. It is therefore relevant to note
that on the one hand this dissenting opinion opens a broad semantic direction since Burger’s position is part of an implicit consideration of elements which are not required to be explicitly stated. On the other hand,
the reasoning applicable in situations involving the death penalty is recalled, as well as a justification of the particular nature of the decision
concerning Sandra Lockett who was not directly involved in the murder.
Therefore, behind this rationale, we can understand the fundamental factors that take precedence in Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning: the role
played in the murder as well as the intention. He deepened the arguments
presented in Lockett and extended them to clarify the legal contours.
Nevertheless, the decision has certain limits as to the instructions to
be followed since the Court in Eddings did not directly establish a standard for similar cases when a sentence did not consider mitigating evidence
in conformity with Lockett principles. From then on, Chief Justice Burger
departed from the Court’s majority opinion in subsequent cases.
In Skipper v. South Carolina, the defendant was convicted of murder
and rape, but three testimonies were barred.39 These were the testimonies
of two jailers and one visitor regarding the defendant’s good adjustment
to his situation while in jail awaiting trial. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision following the Lockett v. Ohio 40 jurisprudence and also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 41 reversed the inmate’s death sentence on the grounds
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 121-22.
476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
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that the trial court had excluded “from the sentencing hearing of the testimony of the jailers and the visitor denied petitioner his right to place before the sentencing jury all relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment.” 42 Yet the Supreme Court was divided 6-3: Justice White wrote the
majority opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and O’ Connor while three justices took part in concurring opinion written by Justice Powell. In this concurrence, Chief Justice Burger along with Justices Powell and Rehnquist considered the majority opinions as “overly broad” and joined the reversal on the narrower
grounds that the defendant should have been allowed to testify to defend
himself against the prosecutor’s charges that he represented a danger both
outside and inside prison and that he was highly likely to commit further
crimes involving sexual abuse within a penitentiary system. This concurring opinion does not rest on the reasoning established by previous case
law. 43
The stare decisis on which the opinion in the Gardner case was based
was the fact that due process had been denied because “petitioner in this
case was not permitted to ‘deny or explain’ evidence on which his death
sentence may, in part, have rested.” 44 It is worth noting that once again
the Supreme Court seems to encounter difficulties interpreting Lockett
and thus the individuality of each situation involving a possible sentence
of punishment is reinforced. Nevertheless, the Skipper judgment adds a
new dimension to the Lockett doctrine. Hence, it is on individual particularism that the rule of law in the Lockett judgment is reaffirmed to allow
for the consideration of individual elements, in this case the behavior of
the detainee during his pre-trial detention. Skipper thus extends the notion
of mitigating factors, as interpreted by the Burger Court, to the post-crime
period and, in relation to this, not just to the prior elements that characterized the circumstances surrounding the Lockett decision. “It is indeed
novel doctrine that compliance with this advice by a defendant charged
with capital murder becomes a ‘mitigating factor’ that the sentencing
judge or jury must—as a matter of constitutional law—consider in passing
sentence.” 45 Thus, in the continuity of the Lockett precedent, states resorting to the death penalty must take into consideration the period of pre-trial
detention in terms of mitigating factors, that is to say ‘‘character or record
‘‘ as the majority opinion indicates. 46
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Skipper, 476 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 9.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 11 (1977).
Id. at 15 n.3.
Id. at 12.
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A per curium opinion was filed by Justice Scalia—appointed in 1986
by President Reagan to the Court upon the retirement of Chief Justice
Burger (replaced in his position by Justice Rehnquist)—in the 1987 case
Hitchcock v. Dugger. 47 This case concerned a death penalty statute, which
crafted a jury and judge instruction that limited their consideration of mitigating factors to those which were listed. The Court unanimously held
that it was not in conformity with Lockett and its progeny as it presented
an exhaustive list of mitigating factors. In a unified voice, the Supreme
Court asserted that “our cases hold that the exclusion of mitigating evidence of the sort at issue here renders the death sentence invalid.”48 It
should be noted that in this ruling the Supreme Court directly refers to the
Lockett jurisprudence using the terms “the requirements of Lockett,”
which may suggest that the Court operates in total consensus in the individualization and interpretation of the scope of mitigating factors. 49 Nevertheless, this consensus in extending and clarifying the Lockett principle
was not sustained over time.
In 1988 the Court seized a case that extended Skipper. Franklin v.
Lynaugh involved an inmate who was in a similar situation to that of the
defendant in Hitchock, where the jury instruction relating to mitigating
factors represented the major issue of the case. 50 Here it does not relate to
the civil party but to the defendant. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s sentence of death via a 6- 3 decision. Justice
White wrote the plurality opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy
while Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissent in which both Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined. The Court found no constitutional error in
the case as far as mitigating circumstances were concerned and explained
the legal grounds on which Skipper was based. 51
The Court asserted that the “discussion in Skipper of the relevancy
of such disciplinary record evidence in capital sentencing decisions dealt
exclusively with the question of how such evidence reflects on a defendant’s likely future behavior.” 52 It held that “the Texas capital sentencing
system adequately allows for jury consideration of mitigating circumstances, and therefore sufficiently provides for jury discretion.” 53 The

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987).
Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 164, 170 (1988).
476 U.S. at 8.
Franklin, 487 U.S. at 178.
Id. at 166.
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Court reiterated that each state has its own discretion in the scheduling of
mitigating circumstances for the attention of the jury and that it “has never
held that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction
telling the jury to revisit the question of his guilt as a basis for mitigation.” 54 Even though Skipper had extended the Lockett doctrine to the inmate’s record in detention for mitigating circumstances, Franklin v.
Lynaugh does not confer further rights to inmates. 55 Parker v. Dugger is
a continuation of the Lockett legacy and its application in the individual
character of the death penalty. 56 This case included a situation that is not
uncommon to states that are defined as “weighing state[s]” (i.e., where
state legislation enumerates a list of both aggravating as well as attenuating circumstances). 57 Per this type of legislation, the death penalty can be
imposed when the aggravating circumstances significantly surpass the
mitigating factors regarding both the crime and the criminal. 58 Many
states took an approach similar to that of Florida during this period. In
Parker, under the legislation of the state of Florida, per Fla. Stats. §§
921.141 (2) and 921.141 (3), the judge can determine the sentence solely
by referring to the aggravating circumstances following a jury’s recommendation. consider any attenuating elements.
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, ruled for Parker in a majority
opinion by Sandra Day O’Connor, which Justices Marshall, Stevens,
Blackmun, and Souter joined. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion,
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined.
The Court considered that the position adopted by the State of Florida was
arbitrary and inconsistent with its jurisprudence, stating that “the Florida
Supreme Court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to treat adequately Parker’s nonstatutory mitigating evidence.” 59 Based on Lockett
case law, the Court reiterated all the major roles played by appellate courts
in relative cases involving a possible sentence of death and they accentuated “the crucial role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the
death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally.” 60
The Court examined the issue of mitigating factors, considering the
difficulty of their assessment. It stated that “nonstatutory evidence, pre-

54. Id. at 165.
55. Id. at 183.
56. 498 U.S. 308, 318 (1991).
57. Id. (Referring to the following statutes: Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(5) and 921.141(6) (1985 and
Supp. 1990).
58. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985).
59. 498 U.S. at 308.
60. Id. at 321.
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cisely because it does not fall into any predefined category, is considerably more difficult to organize into a coherent discussion.” 61 The Court
stated the that several elements fell within this framework: “finally, numerous witnesses testified on Parker’s behalf at the sentencing hearing
concerning his background and character. Their testimony indicated both
a difficult childhood, including an abusive, alcoholic father, and a positive
adult relationship with his own children and with his neighbors.” 62 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant was denied meaningful appellate review when the Florida Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the
availability of non-statutory mitigating evidence by confirming the orientation of its Lockett case law, on the basis of which, “[w]hat is important . . . is an individualized determination on the basis of the character
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” 63 The Court then
remanded the case.
Another feature of Lockett case law concerns the prerogatives of
states regarding decisions on the death penalty. This element, presented
in the dissenting opinion, reveals a certain erosion of the concept of cooperative federalism. This concept faces major difficulties, particularly
within the Supreme Court’s approach and with the legal and political conceptions driving then recently appointed Justice Scalia.
Several appointments of Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court were
part of President Reagan’s desire to influence the Court in accordance
with his 1980 election campaign agenda. This influence began with the
appointment of Arizona Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme
Court in 1981. The President then decided to elevate a conservative Justice, William Rehnquist, to the position of Chief Justice in 1986 when
Warren Burger retired. Much political attention and debate occurred after
this elevation. Reagan filled Justice Rehnquist’s role as an associate justice with Antonin Scalia. Additionally, in 1988, Anthony Kennedy replaced Justice Powell.
By 1991, Reagan’s appointees’ influence over the Court was fundamental, especially regarding the legal conservatism of Justice Scalia. In
1982, Scalia stated in the Harvard Journal of Law and Policy, “the decision concerning which level of government should have the last word is,
therefore, a pragmatic one, to be determined by the practicalities of the
matter.” 64 Notably, in 1950, Edward Corwin, for whom the conception of
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1982).

Id. at 318.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 321.
Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 19-20
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cooperative federalism resulted in ever expanding federal power, which
impacted state sovereignty, had expressed a major concern regarding the
challenge of institutional relations in the future. In his article The Passing
of Dual Federalism, Corwin asked whether, given the new federal dominance, states could even be salvaged “for any useful purpose.” 65
The dissenting opinion in Parker v. Dugger, made it possible to initiate an answer. It takes the form of a “do-over” in favor of states in the
face of over-invasive federalism. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that in this habeas corpus
review, the majority had given “far too little deference to state courts that
are attempting to apply their own law faithfully and responsibly.” 66
Yet, the consensus ended in 1990 thus starting to expose the Court to
fissures on the doctrine of stare decisis correlated with the Lockett ruling.
II. A FISSURE IN THE LOCKETT DOCTRINE FROM THE SUPREME COURT
TO STATES
Lockett v. Ohio redefined the search for a viable standard in death
penalty cases, and raised more questions about mitigating factors as it provided a new framework. This trend in the sentencing of the death penalty,
with the consideration of individual and vague elements led the legislator
of the federal states to reiterate and re-conceptualize the notion of aggravating factors as a legislative check on judicial interpretation. The new
laws circumscribed the possibilities for interpretation by either reducing
the prosecutor’s possibilities for a capital punishment application or reinforcing the options for charging. Political considerations and controversies appeared in the politics–law relationship, particularly around rulings
generated in the wake of Lockett in order to determine their impact and
significance. It is a question of analyzing the excesses of the ultra-safe
speech both in a perspective of conquest of public opinion or satisfaction
of the electorate.
A.

The End of Consensus, Beyond and Back to stare decisis

A doctrinal consensus of the Supreme Court under Lockett that lasted
for more than a decade began to erode in Penry v. Lynaugh. 67 In this judgment, the Court addressed two questions. The first was the conformity of
its execution regarding the Eighth Amendment and an accused having

65. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-24 (1950).
66. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 324 (1991).
67. 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
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mental disabilities. Penry’s psychological evaluations revealed that his
overall intelligence was that of a child aged 6 and a half years and that he
had a social age of a child aged 9–10 years. 68 The second issue was connected to Lockett and its case law. On this point, the Court considered
Penry’s claim that under Texas law, the death penalty was unconstitutional because his mental retardation was a mitigating circumstance. In
Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court delivered its first decision regarding
the execution of offenders with mental retardation. This decision was important due to its abandonment of “mental age” as a useful forensic concept. 69 Indeed, the term “mental age” was considered insufficient for a
categorical Eighth Amendment rule. Regarding the execution of a convicted murderer with mental retardation, the Court offered “no direction
home,” 70 opting for a vague position by indicating that “the Eighth
Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded capital murderers.” 71 On this point, the majority opinion ruled that,
“So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence
of mental retardation in imposing a sentence, an individualized determination whether ‘death is the appropriate punishment’ can be made in each
particular case.” 72
In Lockett case law, the plural majority opinion reaffirmed the need
to consider attenuating circumstances because:
[T]he jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned
moral response’ to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision, as
is required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Lockett,
Eddings, and subsequent decisions. Those decisions were based on the

68. Id. at 307–08.
At a competency hearing held before trial, a clinical psychologist, Dr. Jerome Brown, testified that Penry was mentally retarded. As a child, Penry was diagnosed as having organic
brain damage, which was probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth. Penry was tested
over the years as having an IQ between 50 and 63, which indicates mild to moderate retardation. Dr. Brown’s own testing before the trial indicated that Penry had an IQ of 54.
Dr. Brown’s evaluation also revealed that Penry, who was 22 years old at the time of the
crime, had the mental age of a 6 1/2-year-old child, which indicated that, “he has the ability
to learn and the learning or the knowledge of the average 6 1/2-year-old kid.” Penry’s
social maturity, or ability to function in the world, was that of a 9–10 year old. Dr. Brown
testified that, “there’s a point at which anyone with [Penry’s] IQ is always incompetent,
but, you know, this man is more in the borderline range.”
69. Ian Freckelton QC, Offenders with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: Sentencing
Challenges after the Abolition of Execution in the United States, 23 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L.
321, 321-35 (2016).
70. Michael L. Perlin, “No Direction Home”: The Law and Criminal Defendants with Mental
Disabilities, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 605, 605-12 (1996).
71. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 305.
72. Id. at 340.
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principle that punishment must be directly related to the defendant’s personal culpability, and that a defendant who commits crimes attributable
to a disadvantaged background or emotional and mental problems may
be less culpable than one who has no such excuse. 73

This is a reaffirmation of the constitutionality of the death penalty because
crime-related facts as well as the influence of endogenous and exogenous
criminal factors and their impact on the criminal and his act are considered. The Court stated that there was “[an] absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to a petitioner’s mitigating evidence of mental retardation and abused background by declining
to impose the death penalty.” 74
In Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice Scalia began to create distance from
Lockett case law by declaring in his concurring and dissenting opinion
that, “in providing for juries to consider all mitigating circumstances insofar as they bear upon (1) deliberateness, (2) future dangerousness, and
(3) provocation, it seems to me Texas had adopted a rational scheme that
meets the two concerns of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” 75 His
criticism of the majority opinion is clear when he refers to “an unguided,
emotional ‘moral response’ that the Court demands be allowed—an outpouring of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a defendant’s life
and personality, an unfocused sympathy.” 76
Walton v. Arizona caused a major split in the Supreme Court when
Justice Scalia led a direct, major confrontation of the Lockett doctrine and
its subsequent jurisprudence by constructing his opinion as a fundamental
disagreement with the premises put forth in Penry. 77 Justice Scalia refuted
the overly vague definition of mitigating circumstances as individualized
in the Lockett ruling, which has since been articulated via stare decisis.
Justice Scalia clearly stated his belief that there was major disagreement
between Lockett and Furman, with the former creating an arbitrary assessment due to the individualization of the mitigating factors, latter precisely
denouncing the arbitrary aspect of the death penalty.
Thus, per Justice Scalia, the effects of this legacy included a lack of
coherence and a failure of the Court to achieve a uniform and rational
system of capital punishment that followed the intention of Furman. 78
This resulted in a suspension of the death penalty, including a retroactive
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 304.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 358-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 359-60.
497 U.S. 639, 690 (1990).
408 U.S. at 239.
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effect and readjustment by national laws to achieve more precise criteria
for compliance with the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, in this major and
profound reversal, Justice Scalia indicated that he would not comply with
the Lockett principle and would no longer defend contentious situations
under the Eighth Amendment, which would limit the discretionary power
of lower courts. Thus, in the logic of his previous opinions, Justice Scalia
referred to state sovereignty and an appreciation of the mitigating aspect
of circumstantial factors in the context of a case involving capital punishment. The Supreme Court’s opinion was problematic:
The majority’s failure to address the conflicting principles governing
state death penalty statutes and the narrow split between the Supreme
Court justices in Walton v. Arizona are likely to further confuse, rather
than resolve the concerns of, state legislatures as to what is constitutionally required when sentencing capital defendants to death. 79

Following the Furman decision, the Supreme Court attempted to combat
discrimination in judgments and the notion of using arbitrary elements
against the black community in the United States (which was overrepresented not only among those executed but also among victims) by implementing an outline and instructions that would help eliminate these elements. Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Thomas in 1993 after President
George H. W. Bush appointed the rather conservative justice to the Supreme Court. Thomas decided to no longer consider Lockett as a reference
in the matter of the death penalty but to return to Furman in Graham v.
Collins. 80
Justice Thomas’s Supreme Court opinions have been based upon
originalism and thus have correlated with natural law yet have varied, depending on the case. His judicial philosophy has been characterized by
applying the approach of a color-blind Constitution. While the different
ways in which Justice Thomas approaches constitutional questions are understandable. Given “his life experiences, the inconsistent originalism that
results is itself a policy choice.” 81 Although this approach ensures that
Justice Thomas will not go against his personal beliefs regarding inherent
equality in racial cases, it causes him to apply strict originalism systematically to other issues. 82
79. Lori L. Nader, Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion Surrounding the Sentencing of Capital
Defendants Continues, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 508 (1991).
80. 506 U.S. 461, 470 (1993).
81. Clarence Thomas, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431,
1438 (2008).
82. Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’ Rights Jurisprudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1331-33 (1999).
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In Graham v. Collins, granting Graham a writ of habeas corpus
would result in the creation of a constitutional rule, which would in turn
require a special instruction to the jury to consider the extenuating circumstances as presented by the defense. 83 Justice White delivered the 5–
4 majority opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals by ruling that to support Graham’s petition would indeed create a new constitutional rule extending beyond the reasoning of
the precedents that were in place at the time of the conviction. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas seized the opportunity to express his judicial conception of the doctrine of Lockett.
For Justice Thomas, the purpose of this decision was to end the arbitrator’s role in a specific context after the implementation of the Civil
Rights Act. “Furman v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused
with concern about race bias in the administration of the death penalty—
particularly in Southern States and most particularly in rape cases.” 84
Above all, it was intended to counterbalance the well-known effects of
discrimination against African Americans. As he indicated in his opinion,
the unquestionable importance of race in Furman is reflected in the fact
that three of the original four petitioners in the Furman cases were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. This
representation was part of a concerted ‘national litigative campaign
against the constitutionality of the death penalty’ waged by a small number of ambitious lawyers and academics on the Fund’s behalf. 85

This originalist interpretation of Lockett now implies that the intention is
no longer the same: ”We cannot carry on such a business, which makes a
mockery of the concerns about racial discrimination that inspired our decision in Furman.” 86
The individualized nature of the award is notable when considering
that individual factors de facto deprived the black community of the mitigating historical factors that are associated with recent segregation. These
elements were ultimately dismissed by also individualizing the crime and
disempowering society to reinforce the notion of individual choices being
linked to individual trajectories based on the conservative political ap-

83.
84.
85.
86.

506 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 500.
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proach that advocated for democracy and a society without discrimination.
In the judgment of Justice Thomas, one can see a rejection of positive
discrimination yet an increased emphasis on free arbitrariness of the human being beyond explanatory environmental mitigating factors. The following cases, in the context of the Lockett legacy on the issue of extenuating circumstances, focused on a jury instruction regarding mitigating
factors. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court again heard the Penry case, 87
which was known as Penry II. 88 They ruled that a nullification instruction
did not allow the jury to give “full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances” when determining the most appropriate sentence. 89
The same position was shared in Smith v. Texas, in which the Court cited
Penry II in a 7-2 per curiam opinion and ruled that instructing the jury to
return a false answer to a special issue to avoid a death sentence did not
allow them to fully consider Smith’s relevant mitigating circumstances. 90
In 2004, the Court considered the question of age as a mitigating circumstance making the death sentence impossible in Tennard v. Dretke,. 91
In a 6–3 decision written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that Tennard’s mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to
his crime. The Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently
allow the jury to weigh Tennard’s mental retardation in his favor.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that the execution of
persons with limited intellectual capacity constituted a violation of the
Eighth Amendment because it represented major mitigating circumstances but left the states with an appreciation of the notion of mental retardation. 92 This interpretation and return to national legislation were confirmed in 2014, when Hall v. Florida adopted the term “intellectually
disabled” to replace “mentally retarded.” 93 This reduced the state’s margin of discretion regarding this element in relation to capital punishment.
The majority opinion asserted the following:
In Atkins v. Virginia, we explained that impaired intellectual functioning
is inherently mitigating: ‘[T]oday our society views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’
Nothing in our opinion suggested that a mentally retarded individual

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 784 (2001).
Id. at 797.
543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004).
542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004).
536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
134 S.Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
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must establish a nexus between her mental capacity and her crime before
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing her is triggered.
Equally, we cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is
not relevant mitigating evidence—and thus that the Penry question need
not even be asked—unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the
crime. 94

Clearly, we are witnessing a complex relationship between the discretionary power of the state and the directives of the Supreme Court, where ambiguity prevails on this point. Each party readjusts, with the states doing
so per constraints that are specific to them, including popular sovereignty,
which is of major importance at the local level.
B.

Lockett’s Legacy and its Contemporary Political and Legal
Challenges

The Lockett principle has strengthened the discretion of the judges
and the jury, as well as discretion in individualizing the mitigating factors.
This approach is of great importance to the American constitutional practice of the jury as an institution. The case Ring v. Arizona has also reinforced the importance of a jury and, when the evaluation of the sentence
involves examination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
necessity of entrusting case decisions that could lead to the death penalty
to a popular jury and not to a judge. 95 The arguments put forward by the
Court reference the arbitrary aspect of applying the death penalty when a
judgment is rendered by a judge. Nevertheless, in continuity with the Supreme Court’s case law, the decision resurfaces in this perspective on procedural harmonization of the whole question raised by the Furman decision, 96 one that Gregg 97 and the individualization of the mitigating
circumstances of Lockett’s jurisprudence seemed to have spread for several decades. 98 Beyond the debate’s new beginning, it is apparent that regarding the application of the death penalty, the entire political relationship in the exercise of the institutions displaces the issue of
individualization and harmonization with a question of power relations
between state and federal institutions.
In an 8–1 decision in Kansas v. Carr (only Justice Sotomayor dis-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287.
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972).
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
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sented), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require juries deciding capital cases to be informed that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the previous sentence was in conformity with the Eighth Amendment as it did not
violate the principle of “individualized sentencing determination.” 99 The
Court’s very broad approach is consistent with relevant case law, yet it
differs from its traditional approach in similar cases in the sense that very
few referrals are made to previous jurisprudence. Written by Justice
Scalia, the opinion opts for text-focused methodology. It is not surprising
that the decision is based on this procedure given Scalia’s position on the
Lockett case, which is no longer stare decisis; instead, he skips to Furman.
The central issue is that the merits of the case focus on the notion of reasonable doubt and jury instruction on the subject of mitigating factors.
The scope is thus differentiated from the notion of mitigating factors and
their place in the procedure.
The question of intervention or interference in the autonomy of the
federated states as a major institutional stake in the entirety of American
constitutional history, beginning with the debates of the federalist and
anti-federalist factions. Some states fundamentally began by adopting the
concept of judicial override, allowing the judge to go against the jury’s
sentence in favor of execution in cases where the jury pronounces the
death penalty.
Unlike federalist judges who according to the Constitution “shall
hold their offices during good behavior” and therefore once appointed and
confirmed serve until their resignation, retirement or death, state court
judges are subject to an effective removal power exercised by the people. 100 Indeed, they must face voters. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
stated:
the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. 101

As Kenneth Culp Davis underlined:
the reality is that nearly all [the prosecutor’s] decisions to prosecute or
not to prosecute. . . and nearly all his reasons for decisions are carefully
99. 136 S.Ct. 633, 644 (2016).
100. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1.
101. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1909).
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kept secret, so that review by the electorate is nonexistent except for the
occasional case that happens to be publicized. The plain fact is that more
than nine-tenths of local prosecutors’ decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one. 102

The cases which receive a wider public attention are those with a death
penalty or life sentence charge. As the Supreme Court held in Imbler v
Pachtman, prosecutors are totally immune for any activity considered to
be “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
103
Even though the principle of prosecutorial immunity has been challenged several times, it is still in effect and also clearly appears in the Rule
3.8 of the American Bar Association. 104
Accountability to the electorate is thus fundamental and their satisfaction essential. As more than 95% of county and municipal chief prosecutors are elected, it is evident that the electoral process operates and
influences the Judiciary. 105 In Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia also emphasized that “under our system of government, the primary check against
prosecutorial abuse is a political one.” 106 As Hamilton pointed out in Federalist Paper No. 70, “The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are a due dependence on the people, and a due responsibility.” 107 The fact that prosecutors and judges of the national courts are
subject to popular sovereignty through elections leads to a difficult separation of powers and an impact on elements that divide the electorate.
With regards to this as far as the death penalty and where the Lockett v.
Ohio jurisprudence is concerned, both the concept of judicial override in
situations with respect to the constitutional application of Lockett’s jurisprudence and the fundamental role played by prosecutors are underlined.
As Justice Sotomayor noted while dissenting in Woodward v. Alabama,
there is no evidence that criminal activity is more heinous in Alabama
than in other states, or that Alabama juries are particularly lenient in
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The only answer
that is supported by empirical evidence is one that, in my view, casts a
cloud of illegitimacy over the criminal justice system: Alabama judges,
who are elected in partisan proceedings, appear to have succumbed to

102. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 207-08 (1969).
103. 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor, American Bar Association.
105. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
734 (1996).
106. 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988).
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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electoral pressures. 108

The rate of judicial overrides is therefore correlated to election years for
judges.
A study conducted by Reuters reviewed 2,102 state Supreme Court
rulings on death penalty appeals from the 37 states that heard such cases
over the past 15 years. 109 The study connected the results in those cases to
the way each state chooses its justices: “in the 15 states where high court
judges are directly elected, justices rejected the death sentence in 11 percent of appeals, less than half the 26 percent reversal rate in the seven
states where justices are appointed.” 110 “There are men all over the U.S.
who are going to die because of politics. That’s a basic component of the
death penalty,” said Tim Young, director of the Office of the Ohio Public
Defender. 111 Until 2016, there were three states where judicial override
was in force, namely Alabama, Florida, and Delaware. The Supreme
Court struck down Florida’s capital sentence in January 2016 on the
grounds that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find
each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.”112 In response, the
Florida legislature eliminated override power in March of 2016, 113 and the
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated its own override system on August
2, 2016. 114
In 2017, the Alabama legislature passed a statute banning judicial
override that came into effect on April 11, 2017.115 However, the statute
does not have a retroactive effect, so each accusation and detention occurring prior to this statute might be subject to judicial override.116 Judges in
Alabama have reserved the right to override jury verdicts.117 In Colbert

108. Id. at 408.
109. Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, In States With Elected High Court Judges, A Harder Line
on Capital Punishment, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Sep. 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investiga
tes/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/ [https://perma.cc/TV5X-VW44].
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016); See H.B. 7101, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Fl. 2016).
113. See H.B. 7101, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2016).
114. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 490 (Del. 2016); See Patrick Mulvaney & Katherine Chamblee,
Innocence and Override, 126 YALE L.J. F. 118, 228 (2016).
115. Ashley Remkus, Did Judicial Override End in Alabama? Some Say Judges Can Still Overrule Jury Over Death Penalty, AL.COM (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/huntsville/i
ndex.ssf/2017/07/death_penalty_judicial_overrid.html. [https://perma.cc/LKD3-URNB].
116. Adam Liptak, Alabama Judges Retain the Right to Override Juries in Capital Sentencing,
NY TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/us/alabama-judges-retain-theright-to-override-juries-in-capital-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/GQ2F-ZK96].
117. Id.
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County, for example, Circuit Judge Hal Houghston Jr. had the final say
by sentencing the defendant Benjamin Young to death using his judicial
override power on March 13, 2018. 118 Meanwhile, in the Stephen Stone
Case, the trial is set for January 28th, 2019. 119 In late August of this year,
the defense requested that the Madison County circuit judge not apply judicial override on the grounds that the law “fails to directly address the
circumstances here: Specifically, a case where a defendant is charged . . .
prior to April 11, 2017, “but neither convicted, nor sentenced before April
11, 2017. . . Mr. Stone falls into this gap created by the Statute’s ambiguity.” 120 However, Madison County Circuit Judge Pate replied, “the Court
finds that there is no prohibition against judicial override in this case.” 121
In a recent interview with AL.com, Madison County Chief Trial Attorney
Tim Gann reaffirmed this position saying, “It is our opinion that this case
predates the law and we believe that judicial override still applies.” 122
Clearly, the issue of judicial override in death penalty cases remains unresolved and will fuel political and judicial debate for years to come.
III. CONCLUSION
Four decades later, the evolution of the Lockett principle and its heritage underscores the interpretative problem of a lengthy but imprecise
jurisprudence. Lockett v. Ohio has exposed the difficulties inherent to satisfying a volatile and ambiguous electorate. Indeed, it raises broader fundamental questions regarding law and politics.
The Lockett case and its progeny paralleled the climax of neoliberalism which marked the following decade. In terms of mitigating factors, it
has been difficult to define them or their impacts on a fair trial. Crime
analysis has shifted from the circumstances to the criminal, establishing a
difficult balance between aggravated circumstances and mitigating factors. The Supreme Court has provided some clarification and attempted to

118. Bernie Delinksi, Young Sentenced to Death, TIMES DAILY (Mar 13, 2018),
https://www.timesdaily.com/news/local/young-sentenced-to-death/article_b53e9fb7-b60d-5efd-b75
5-424c01c5d1b.html [https://perma.cc/EP4U-XT74]. B.Young was convicted of Ki-Jana Freeman ‘s
capital murder, first-degree assault of Tyler Blythe and shooting into an occupied vehicle
119. Ashley Remkus, Man Competent for Death Penalty Trial in Slayings of Wife and 7-YearOld Son, Judge Rules, ADVANCE LOCAL, Aug. 24, 2018 , https://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index
.ssf/2018/08/stephen_marc_stone_huntsville_1.html. [https://perma.cc/JQ9P-DF4Z].
120. Ashley Remkus, Lawyers Ask Judge to Ban Herself from Overriding Jury’s Sentence in
Death Penalty Case, Advance Local, July 19, 2018, https://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/
2018/07/stephen_stone_judicial_ov.html. [https://perma.cc/6HQX-4KXF].
121. Id.
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counter this arbitrariness. However, these clarifications have occurred in
a nonlinear and vague manner. The current Supreme Court is further divided in its appreciation of mitigating factors and individualization in
2018. This situation raises concerns about the norm of stare decisis related
to the Lockett rule, its conflict with Furman’s objective, and its contradicto in adjecto.
In this period of confusion and conflicts, even though judicial override is no longer characterized as a constitutional practice, the principle of
non-retroactivity places it at the core of issues related to the death penalty
and the individualization of mitigating factors. The jury’s emotional response may conflict with its moral response. The tendency towards leniency may contradict public opinion seeking greater stiffness. The notion
of the “government of judges when it comes to capital punishment opens
up another perspective. In this particular situation, this viewpoint combines the notion of popular sovereignty and its corollary, direct representation, creating the controversial notion of a government of judges by the
people. Here, Bickel’s counter-majoritarian difficulty and Ackerman’s
theory of dualism come into play. With a pivotal appointment in the Supreme Court in 2018 and more to come in the future, the predictability of
an unpredictable institution may lead to a more partisan Court. Chief Justice Roberts’s influence certainly will not lead to controversial orientations, but it might provide a more precise vision of Lockett’s legacy.

